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The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 allows courts in England and Wales to alter the distributive scheme of a will (or intestacy allocation), where certain statutory criteria are met (see generally Douglas, 2014) . Applications are restricted to specific relatives and dependants of the deceased (listed in s 1(1) of the Act), who must demonstrate that the will (or intestacy) failed to make "reasonable financial provision" (1975 Act, s 1(2)). Success is not guaranteed, and courts must apply a range of both general and category specific factors when assessing individual claims (1975 Act, s 3(1) and ss 3(2)- (4) Ilott v Mitson) ends a long-running legal saga, involving an adult daughter who had been excluded from her mother's will. This is the first time that a family provision case has reached the highest court in the UK; but while this particular litigation is now over, and the right outcome (in the author's opinion) more or less reached on the facts, important issues remain.
The facts of the case are well-known, and can be summarised briefly. Heather Ilott and her widowed mother, Melita Jackson, had been estranged since 1978 when Heather left home to be with, and subsequently marry, a man that her mother disapproved of.
Mother and daughter never reconciled (there had been several futile attempts over the years), and when Melita executed her final will in April 2002, she left her entire estate to three animal charities that she had no lifetime connection to. Melita wrote to her daughter, informing her that she would inherit nothing; Heather replied, accepting this.
When Melita died in 2004, The Blue Cross, RSPB and RSPCA were gifted a net estate of £486,000. Heather Ilott, then aged 44, was mother to five children, had not worked since the birth of her first child in 1983 and was living in a 3-bedroom property rented from a Housing Association. Her husband worked part-time, and the family were dependent on state benefits to meet basic living expenses. More specifically, the Ilott litigation raises the broader issue of where 'independent' adult children-ie. those who are economically self-sufficient or, at least, capable of earning a living, and who were not financially dependent on a now deceased parent (even if in financial need)-fit within the current succession law narrative. Family provision claims by independent adult children have always been one of the most contentious aspects of the 1975 Act, for all sorts of reasons (Conway, 2015) . These include the absence of a pre-existing financial tie; the fact that reasonable financial provision for adult children (like every category of applicant under the 1975 Act, with the exception of surviving spouses or civil partners) is limited to "maintenance" under s 1(2)(b); and courts only having one, inherently limited specific factor to weigh here: namely, the "manner in which the applicant was being, or...might expect to be, educated or trained" (1975 Act, s 3(3) ). The Court of Appeal judgments in Ilott were seen as turning points, signifying that adult children who had been disinherited (whether wholly or partly) could succeed and be given a significant award, despite not having been financially reliant on their dead parent (Holland, 2012; Douglas, 2016) . However, the Supreme Court ruling suggests otherwise, and that independent adult children who lack 'reasonable financial provision' will probably receive much less generous awards than the Court of Appeal gave Heather Ilott. It also emphasises that financial need is not enough, Lord Hughes describing it as "a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an order" ([2017] UKSC 17 at [19] ); and even where the applicant's needs were obvious (as in the present case, where the daughter was living in very straitened financial circumstances), these might not be met in full. Other demands on the estate, as well as the relationship between the applicant and the deceased, could act as limiting factors.
The fact that Heather Ilott and her family were reliant on state benefits was another central feature of this particular litigation. In deciding that the deceased's will had failed to make reasonable financial provision for her daughter, Sir Nicholas Wall P in the first Court of Appeal ruling rejected any notion that "a claim under the [1975] Act can properly be used to relieve the State of the obligation to support an applicant" (2011] EWCA Civ 346 at [14] ). And when the addressing the issue of quantification, both District Judge Million and the Court of Appeal in its second ruling in Ilott were cognisant of the £16,000 eligibility threshold for mean-tested benefits, structuring their awards to preserve Housing and Council Tax Benefits as a significant part of the family's net annual income (something that the Supreme Court did not query). One might question whether, in an era of reduced public spending and ongoing welfare reforms, Melita Jackson should have been able to leave an estate worth almost half a million pounds to three animal welfare charities while her daughter and her family survived almost exclusively on benefits and a small sum of savings. As Lady Hale pointed out in Ilott, our succession
